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Exemption 7 (C) in Context
Must federal agencies consider the "personal privacy" of corporations in
determining whether to release records pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act' (FOIA)? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently answered this question affirmatively in a decision that the Supreme
Court will review this Term. The case, AT & T v. FCC (AT&T),' comes in the
midst of a heated public debate over the proper scope of corporate personhood
that was sparked by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement that artificial
entities, like natural persons, enjoy a right to free speech that is protected by
the First Amendment.' The Court's decision in Citizens United has been
subjected to withering criticism by President Obama, members of Congress,
and Court-watchers for allegedly failing to recognize that the policy
justifications for a robust right of individual expression are not readily
translatable to the corporate context.4 Supporters of the decision respond that
1. 5 U.S.C. 5 552 (20o6).
2. 582 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 2010 WL 1623772 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010) (No. 09-
1279).
3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4. Among the most biting critiques of the Court's position was Justice Stevens's impassioned
dissent. Id. at 929, 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[C]orporations have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires .... [T]hey are not themselves members of 'We
the People' by whom and for whom our Constitution was established."); see also Patricia J.
Williams, Corpus Ex Machina, THE NATION (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.thenation.con/
article/corpus-ex-machina?page=full ("It takes either the most simple-minded or the most
cynical state of mind to conclude from this basis that corporations are entitled to the same
panoply of civil and dignitary rights as actual, fully endowed people."). But see Lawrence
Lessig, Citizens Unite, NEw REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2010, 12:oo AM), http://www.tnr.com/
article/politics/citizens-unite ("[T]he Court's entire Citizens United opinion hung upon the
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there is a long tradition in Anglo-American law of analogizing corporations to
natural persons for the purposes of establishing their rights and duties' and cite
1 U.S.C. § 1 in support of this contention.
At first glance, one might be tempted to understand the Third Circuit's
decision in AT&T as compelled by the understanding of corporate personhood
embraced by a majority of the Supreme Court in Citizens United. Although the
Court of Appeals reached its decision before the Court's landmark campaign
finance opinion was released, the appeals court's opinion discussed at length
the meaning of personhood in concluding that AT&T could invoke FOIA's
"personal privacy" exception to prevent the disclosures. Early press coverage of
the Supreme Court's certiorari grant has likewise tended to associate FCC v.
AT&T with the issue of corporate personhood that the Court confronted in
Citizens United. To take one particularly revealing example, a blogger on the
website of The Atlantic recently suggested that Citizens United might provide
insight into the Court's likely holding in AT&T, since "both cases have at their
core the issue of corporate 'personhood' and the rights that accompany it."
The implicit understanding among those who emphasize the Citizens United
connection is that the robust conception of corporate personhood evidenced by
a majority of the Court in that case is likely to dictate an outcome favorable to
AT&T.
But this need not and (as I argue below) should not be the case. What
neither the Third Circuit's opinion nor the analogy to Citizens United
recognizes is that it is the term "privacy," not the term "personal," that most
severely limits the scope of § 552(b)( 7)(C) (Exemption 7(C)). Indeed, as I
argue below, a more nuanced understanding of the concept of privacy-as it is
fact that the First Amendment says nothing about who or what is to get the benefit of its
protection. It simply bans certain kinds of regulation.").
5. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: The First Amendment Rights of Corporate
"Persons," PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2o 1o/oi/citizens-united-v-fec-the-
first-amendment-rights-of-corporate-persons.html.
6. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (20o6) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . the words "person" and "whoever" include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.").
7. Nicole Allan, Supreme Court Will Decide Whether Corporations Have Right to Privacy, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2010, 5:14 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2oo/o9/
supreme-court-will-decide-whether-corporations-have-right-to-privacy/63711/; see also
Adam Liptak & Duff Wilson, Supreme Court Takes Cases on Corporate Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2010, at A2o (describing AT&T as presenting issues of corporate rights
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employed in FOIA and elsewhere in American law-would lead the Supreme
Court to conclude that Exemption 7(C) is inapplicable to AT&T. This is so, not
because a corporation cannot be a "person" for the purposes of the statute, but
because "privacy" is a concept that has meaning only when applied to natural
persons.
In the Part that follows, I recount the facts giving rise to AT&T and provide
a short summary of the Third Circuit's decision and reasoning. Part II goes
beyond the court's decision, developing a more robust notion of privacy by
examining occurrences of the term within the FOIA statute. Parts III and IV
provide support for my reading of the statute by noting that other sources of
law, as well as theoretical explorations of privacy, conceive of it as a right
particular to individuals.
I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DECISION
AT & T v. FCC grew out of an investigation by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) into allegations that AT&T had
overcharged the federal government for certain telecommunications
equipment. As part of that investigation, the FCC required AT&T to produce
sensitive information, including internal e-mails, billing information, and
invoices. The matter terminated with a consent decree, but in 2005 a group of
AT&T's competitors filed a FOIA request aimed at obtaining "[a]ll pleadings
and correspondence contained in" the Commission's investigative file.
AT&T opposed the request on the grounds that the records were protected
by FOIA Exemption 7(C). That provision authorizes federal agencies to
withhold "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes," the
disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."9 AT&T argued that the purpose of
the exemption was to prevent embarrassment and stigmatization as a result of
FOIA disclosures and that the corporation ran such a risk if the challenged
documents were in fact released."o The FCC rejected this position after
concluding that corporations lack "personal privacy" under the exemption.
8. E-mail from Mary C. Albert, Comptel, to FCC (Apr. 4, 2005, 1o:52 EST) (on file with
author).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).
1o. Declaration of Leslie Bowman at 5, AT & T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490 (3 d Cir. 2009) (No. o8-
4024). Specifically, AT&T suggested that evidence regarding the alleged misconduct "could
... be used by competitors or others to attempt to embarrass, harass, and stigmatize AT&T
publicly by, for example, citing such information in press releases, advertisements, or news
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AT&T filed a petition for review of the FCC's order, arguing that the
Commission's interpretation of Exemption 7(C) was incorrect as a matter of
law. In reviewing the petition, the Third Circuit relied heavily on the plain text
of the Act. The court found it particularly relevant that FOIA "defines 'person'
to 'include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or
private organization other than an agency."' Although the statute does not
define "personal privacy," the construction that is at the heart of Exemption
7(C), the court reasoned that "[i]t would be very odd indeed for an adjectival
form of a defined term not to refer back to that defined term."12
Consistent with this reading of the text, the Third Circuit rejected the
FCC's attempt to analogize Exemption 7(C) to § 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6).
That provision, which covers "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy,"" has been interpreted by a number of courts to apply only to
individuals.14 The Third Circuit questioned the accuracy of these decisions but
also noted that, even if the government's characterization of Exemption 6 as
inapplicable to artificial entities was correct, "[t]his does not mean that each
and every component phrase in that exemption, taken on its own, limits
Exemption 6 to individuals."" Because only individuals may be the subjects of
"personnel and medical files," that phrase, rather than the "personal privacy"
language, could limit Exemption 6 to individuals. The court reasoned that
Exemption 7 (C), which does not contain the reference to "personnel and
medical files," might therefore be available to a wider class of claimants.
In holding that Exemption 7(C) may be invoked by corporations, the Third
Circuit also sought to distinguish several precedents in the D.C. Circuit that
suggested that court would apply the exemption only where a disclosure was
likely to implicate an individual's privacy interests. Although the FOIA
decisions of the D.C. courts, which have universal though not exclusive
jurisdiction in this area,16 are generally given substantial weight by other
reports.... Disclosure would, as a result, harm AT&T's reputation and goodwill." Id. app.
at 65.
11. 582 F.3d at 492 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006)).
12. Id. at 497.
13. 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(6).
14. See, e.g., Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 572 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Exemption 6 is applicable
only to individuals."); Hodes v. HUD, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1o8, 119 (D.D.C. 20o8) ("As a
threshold matter, both Parties fail . . . to acknowledge that only individuals (not commercial
entities) may possess protectible privacy interests under Exemption 6.").
15. 582 F.3 d at 497.
16. See 5 U.S.C. §5 52(a)(4)(B).
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courts, the Third Circuit dispensed with the competing precedents in a
footnote. 17
While most of the D.C. Circuit cases concerned the meaning of "personal
privacy" in the context of Exemption 6,' upon which Exemption 7(C) was in
part modeled, Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice" was more
directly on point. In Washington Post Co., Judge Abner Mikva, writing for an
ideologically diverse panel that also included Judges Patricia Wald and David
Sentelle, concluded that Exemption 7(C) does not prevent the disclosure of
"[i]nformation relating to business judgments and relationships."2 o The Post
sought records from the Food and Drug Administration concerning an
investigation into whether the Eli Lilly Company had failed to disclose adverse
reactions to an arthritis drug that it marketed. Lilly attempted to block the
disclosure on several grounds, including that it would compromise the
company's "personal privacy" as protected by Exemption 7(C). In rejecting the
claim, the D.C. Circuit noted that "[t]he disclosures with which the statute is
concerned are those of 'an intimate personal nature' such as marital status,
legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition,
welfare payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights, and reputation.""
The Third Circuit did not discuss Washington Post Co. in detail, noting only
that, like an individual, a corporation has "a strong interest in protecting its
reputation."" The panel then added, "to the extent that [the D.C. Circuit's]
cases can be read to conflict with our textual analysis, we decline to follow
them."" But, as this Comment argues below, even engaging the Third Circuit
on its own textualist terms, there were strong arguments for Exemption 7(C)'s
inapplicability that neither the court nor the litigants adequately considered.
These arguments turn on the meaning of the term "privacy," a matter to which
the court devoted only passing attention.
17. AT&T, 582 F.3 d at 498 n.6.
18. Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F. 3 d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 20o8) ("[B]usinesses
themselves do not have protected privacy interests under Exemption 6 . . . ."); see also Sims,
642 F.2d at 572 n.47 ("Exemption 6 is applicable only to individuals."); Nat'l Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 685 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("The sixth
exemption has not been extended to protect the privacy interests of businesses or
corporations.").
19. 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
20. Wash. Post Co., 863 F.2d at loo.
21. Id. (quoting Sims, 642 F.2d at 573-74).
22. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 498 n.6.
23. Id.
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II. FOIA PRIVACY
The Third Circuit's analysis of Exemption 7(C)'s plain language is open to
the same critique to which the court subjected the FCC's Exemption 6 analogy.
In emphasizing the broad statutory definition of the term "personal," the court
overlooked the possibility that the noun that it modifies - "privacy" - might
itself restrict the scope of the exemption. Indeed, careful attention to the term
"privacy," as it is used both in the statute and in the law more generally, reveals
the court's holding to be anomalous. Privacy, as it is properly understood, is an
interest that is unique to individuals. Therefore, the Third Circuit erred in
holding that Exemption 7(C) removed the AT&T files from FOIA's reach.
While corporations clearly have an interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of certain information, that interest is not a privacy interest.
Confidential business information is protected by another FOIA provision,
Exemption 4, which limits disclosure by federal agencies of "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential."" It was precisely because the billing information that AT&T's
competitors requested from the FCC did not fall within the scope of
Exemption 4 that the company was forced to claim the personal privacy
exception.
The treatment of the term "privacy" in FOIA itself is an instructive place to
begin this inquiry. The word appears only three times in the statute and each
time is modified by the adjective "personal." Two of these appearances come in
the context of the statutorily defined exemptions to FOIA's generally
permissive disclosure regime. Exemption 7(C), the provision at issue in AT&T,
is one; the other is Exemption 6, which, as was noted above, is widely viewed
as applying only to individuals. The recurrence of this phrase in the two
exceptions provides strong evidence for concluding that Exemptions 6 and
7(C) should be read to complement one another. If we accept the validity of
prior constructions of Exemption 6, this complementarity would suggest that
both exemptions should be restricted to natural persons.
While the Third Circuit pointed to Exemption 6's reference to "medical
and personnel files" as a basis for distinguishing the two provisions, that
language describes the type of record to which the provision applies, not the
nature of the harm that it contemplates. There is no question that Congress
intended Exemptions 6 and 7 (C) to govern different types of records. As noted
above, Exemption 7(C) applies only to "records or information compiled for
24- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 4 ) (2006).
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law enforcement purposes."2 s Exemption 6, as the Third Circuit noted, is
directed at a different subset of government records -medical, personnel, and
"similar" files." But although the types of records that come within the two
provisions may differ, the harm from disclosure that they contemplate is the
same: an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."" This phrase gives scope
both to Exemption 6's reference to "similar files" and to the circumstances
under which Exemption 7 (C) should operate to block the release of records. As
noted above, there is wide agreement that Exemption 6's open-ended reference
to "similar files" does not make it available to artificial entities." This, in turn,
suggests that like Exemption 6, Exemption 7(C) should be understood to be
available only to individuals.
In addition to the textual similarities, there are also structural reasons to
read the two provisions and their references to "personal privacy" in parallel.
Exemption 6 protects the individual's privacy interest in documents generated
in connection with the government's role as an employer and a provider of
social services. Exemption 7 then deals separately with "records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes." Documents in this latter class are
publicly available subject to specific carve-outs, so section C provides specific
protection to ensure that the "individual's control of information concerning
his or her person," 9 to which Exemption 6 attends, is not compromised in the
law enforcement context. This structural relationship has been recognized by
the Department of Justice, whose Guide to the Freedom of Information Act has
long noted that Exemption 7(C) is "the law enforcement counterpart to
Exemption 6."3o
Admittedly, there are important textual differences between the
exemptions. In addition to referencing different classes of records, two features
of Exemption 7(C) suggest that it may be triggered more easily than
Exemption 6. First, whereas Exemption 6 requires that any invasion of privacy
that would result from disclosure be "clearly unwarranted," Congress removed
the modifier from Exemption 7(C) in response to executive branch concerns
25. Id. § 5 52(b) (7) (C); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
26. Id. 5 552(b)(6).
27. Id. §§ 552(b)(6), (b)( 7)(c).
28. See supra note 18.
29. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
30. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT561 (2009).
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about law enforcement efficacy and individual privacy.31 Second, Exemption 6
requires that the asserting agency find that the disclosure in question "would
constitute" an invasion of privacy, while Exemption 7(c) requires only a
finding that the disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute" such an
invasion." Consequently, as the Supreme Court recognized in its only decision
addressing the exemptions in detail, "the standard for evaluating a threatened
invasion of privacy interests" in the context of Exemption 7 (C) is somewhat
broader than the standard that attaches to personnel, medical, and similar
files."
But these differences go to the severity of the privacy threat that must be
shown to avoid disclosure. They do not speak to the nature of the threatened
violation nor, most importantly, to whom it may occur. Of course, as the Third
Circuit recognized, "Corporations, like human beings, face public
embarrassment, harassment, and stigma because of [their] involvement [in
criminal investigations]."34 But the harm to an individual of an embarrassing
disclosure is fundamentally different from the harm that a corporation suffers
under similar circumstances. While a corporation may experience financial loss
due to the circulation of compromising information, disclosures that impinge
on "the individual's control of information concerning his or her person"" may
implicate the subject's thoughts, sentiments, and emotions in a deep and
unpredictable manner. Although it might be efficacious to provide
corporations with broad protections under Exemption 7(C) as a means of
"encouraging [them] -like human beings - to cooperate and be forthcoming in
such investigations," 6 the exemption's core concern is not with assuring
compliance so much as with protecting an interest that, as I argue in Part IV, is
unique to human beings.
31. See Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Aug. 20, 1974),
reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 33,158 (1974); Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to
Representative William Moorhead (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 34,162-63
(1974).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
33. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 756; see also SafeCard Servs., Inc. v.
SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 12o6 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that Exemption 7(C) authorizes the
categorical withholding of information that identifies third parties in law enforcement
records whereas the modifier in Exemption 6's reference to a "clearly unwarranted invasion"
is generally understood to incorporate notions of balancing public and private interests).
34. AT & T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 n.5 (3d Cit. 2009).
35. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 763 (describing, in dicta, "the common
law and the literal understandings of privacy").
36. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 498 n.5.
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III.LEGAL PRIVACY
Recognizing, perhaps, that the harms stemming from disclosure of
confidential information are more fundamental for individuals than they are
for business or political entities, the law outside of the FOIA context has
tended to analyze "privacy" as an individual interest rather than an institutional
one. Although a broad survey of the law on corporate privacy is beyond the
scope of this Comment, reference to prominent statutes and common law
doctrines that incorporate notions of privacy provides support for this position.
To take just one example, Congress has chosen to exclude artificial persons
from the safeguards embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974, which establishes fair
practices for the government's handling of personally identifiable
information.17 The legislative history makes clear that this was a conscious
decision. Congress found that the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of personal information by federal agencies posed a threat to the
privacy of "individuals" specifically." The strong implication is that, in
refusing to extend the protections of the Act to artificial entities, Congress
determined that such entities lack a protectable privacy interest.
State courts and legislatures across the United States have reached a similar
conclusion in the private law context. The topic of privacy has figured
prominently in tort law since 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
published their seminal article arguing that a series of seemingly unrelated
court decisions on subjects as disparate as defamation, trespass, and breach of
implied contract were implicitly concerned with protecting the plaintiffs right
to privacy." The "complex of four" privacy torts, as outlined by William
Prosser in an influential law review article'o and later incorporated into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, include: intrusion upon seclusion, public
disclosure of private information, publication of information that places an
individual in a false light, and appropriation of a person's name or likeness.4 1
Following Prosser and the Restatement, most states now recognize some or all
of the privacy torts either as a matter of common law or statute.42
37. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)).
38. Id. (reciting congressional findings).
39. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
40. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960)
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6 5 2A (1977).
42. See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 32 (2007).
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Despite the wide diffusion of the tort law of privacy, however, there is
currently no American jurisdiction in which corporations possess a right to sue
under the classic privacy torts. 43 As one Massachusetts judge recently noted, "A
corporation is not an individual with traits of a highly personal or intimate
nature."' Thus, actions that were intended to remedy wrongs such as
"damage[d] feelings and sensibilities" are inapplicable to entities that are
incapable of experiencing this type of harm." The consensus among state
courts thus seems to be that, although corporations have an interest in
protecting their reputations and their secrets, to do so they must rely on the
law of defamation, trademark, copyright, trade secrets, and unfair trade
practices. This understanding in the state court system fits nicely with the
interpretation of FOIA's structure that I advanced above. Exemption 4, which
provides protection for "privileged or confidential" trade secrets and
information, is the statutory analogue of common law actions that protect
commercial interests. The concept of privacy is simply inapplicable to artificial
entities in either context.
The law in the Fourth Amendment context is not inconsistent with
statutory and common law schemes that uniformly restrict privacy claims to
natural persons. It is true that the Supreme Court, in a 1977 decision, explicitly
characterized a warrantless seizure of documents as violative of the possessor
corporation's "privacy."4 6 But this reference must be understood in light of the
Court's tendency to use the word "privacy" as a term of art in discussing the
scope of the Fourth Amendment's coverage. This practice finds its origins in
Katz v. United States, a case that required the Justices to pass on the
constitutionality of a warrantless wiretap of a public phone booth.47 Rejecting a
line of prior decisions in which the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
turned on whether the government had committed common law trespass, the
Katz Court pronounced the government's conduct unconstitutional, declaring
43. See, e.g., Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 594 (Ind. 2001) (holding that a
unversity, as an artificial entity, could not assert a privacy claim for appropriation against a
former employee who attached its name to his website); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 6521 cmt. c ("A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal
right of privacy.").
44. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass.
so8, 518 (1984)) (upholding a summary dismissal on the grounds that, as a corporation, the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring a privacy action).
45. ALLEN, supra note 42, at 113.
46. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."48 justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in that case established the now-dominant test for
determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections. That test
requires that the party asserting a constitutional violation exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy in the information at issue and that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 49 In recent years,
however, the Court's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has come under
attack as jurists and commentators have recognized both that the term
"privacy" has become a misleading label for the way that Fourth Amendment
doctrine operates in practice and that, at the same time, it has constrained the
constitutional jurisprudence in ways that might be undesirable.
The first basis for critique-that the "privacy" label fails to describe
accurately how the court assesses the coverage of the Fourth Amendment-
arises from the observation that a significant amount of information that is
popularly considered to be private has been determined by the Court to fall
outside of the Fourth Amendment's scope. Thus, for example, although the
Supreme Court ruled in 1978 that bank records are not private within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,so Congress has subsequently acted
through the Right to Financial Privacy Act to limit the ability of law
enforcement to obtain these records without judicial supervision." The name
of the statute demonstrates quite clearly that the popular notion of what
constitutes private information differs substantially from what the Court labels
as private for constitutional purposes. The dynamic between Congress and the
Court on display in the bank records cases has been replicated in the context of
telecommunications privacy law as well as in any number of other areas in
which the Court has spoken to the Fourth Amendment's applicability.s" The
proliferation of statutory and common law schemes that, like the Privacy Act
and the statutes mentioned above, aim to secure an individual's confidential
information, attests to the fact that our shared conception of privacy as a value
is much broader than the interests secured by the Constitution. Indeed, Orin
Kerr has argued recently that, despite the Court's persistent claims that it
decides Fourth Amendment cases involving new technologies on the basis of
48. Id. at 351-53.
49. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
si. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 55 3401-3422 (20o6).
52. See, for example, the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127
(2006), which Congress passed to protect the privacy of numbers dialed from a telephone
after the Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that such numbers
were not "private" in the Fourth Amendment sense.
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what would constitute a "reasonable expectation of privacy," the Court in fact
often relies on property-based principles that are traceable to the pre-Katz era.13
Thus, privacy in the Fourth Amendment context is not the conceptually thick,
socially laden notion that underlies popularly enacted statutes and
incrementally developed common law. Rather than being understood as "an
overarching value," Fourth Amendment privacy is "a quantifiable fact that can
be used to help resolve concrete legal disputes."5
Nor is it clear that it would be desirable if the scope of the Fourth
Amendment were, as the Court claims it is, determined by social expectations
as to what constitutes private information. Indeed, the other major critique of
Justice Harlan's privacy test is that, in purporting to import a set of norms
developed to govern private persons, the test fails to account for the ways in
which state actors are both authorized to intrude into individuals' lives in a way
that an average member of society is not, and a greater threat to individual
autonomy due to their distinctive power.ss Moreover, by linking the Fourth
Amendment exclusively to social conventions, we run the risk that the
increasingly nonprivate nature of our modern world will erode any limitations
that the Amendment might impose on government action.
These observations have led some judges and commentators to suggest
that, rather than privacy, the individual interest at stake in the Fourth
Amendment context might more appropriately be described as an interest in
being free from unjustified or discriminatory government infringement on
autonomy.56 Dissenting in Illinois v. Andrea-a case holding that, once
searched, a container falls outside the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections" -Justice Brennan took pains to remind the majority that "the
right of the people to be secure" includes a right not only to protect the privacy
of information but also to be free from the unnecessary interference of
government actors specifically, whether or not that interference threatens to
53. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 8o, 838 (2004).
54. Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1760 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
5s. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 117-19 (2008) (arguing for
the abandonment of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in favor of a "repoliticized"
Fourth Amendment).
56. See Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAvIS L. REv.
977, 1030-31 (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989);
Sundby, supra note 54, at 1777-85.
57. 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983).
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reveal confidential information.s Indeed, one might understand the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United States," which held that the Fourth
Amendment was violated where police used a thermal camera to photograph
the exterior of a home without first obtaining a warrant, as a recognition that
information that might generally be considered not to be private (such as the
heat emanating from a wall exposed to the world) could nevertheless fall
within the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Recognizing that privacy in the Fourth Amendment context is not
equivalent to the concept of privacy as it is understood popularly and in other
legal contexts allows us to understand better why the Court has seen fit to
distinguish between individuals and corporations in the way that it analyzes
Fourth Amendment interests. The Court has acknowledged that the privacy
interest envisioned by the Fourth Amendment where an individual is
concerned is qualitatively different from the rights against unreasonable search
and seizure possessed by a corporation. As Justice Jackson wrote in United
States v. Morton Salt Co.,6o "[Corporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy." 6, Indeed, one federal
district court has recently rejected the argument that corporations enjoy "full
blown" privacy rights under the Constitution, reading the Fourth Amendment
to provide corporations with only a limited "right to attack general warrants,
which the Framers abhorred, or with a basic due process right against clearly
abusive government searches and seizures."2 Decisions such as these, that
limit the ability of corporations to lay claim to privacy rights, are consistent not
only with the understanding of the Fourth Amendment that I advanced above
but also with the large body of theoretical literature-to which I turn in the
next Part - that views privacy as an interest that is unique to natural persons.
IV. PRIVACY THEORY
Although "the question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA
is, of course, not the same as the question whether a tort action might lie for
invasion of privacy or the question whether an individual's interest in privacy is
58. 463 U.S. 765, 775 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. 553 U.S. 27 (2001).
6o. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
61. Id. at 652.
62. United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65165, at *4 (N.D. Iowa July
28, 2009).
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protected by the Constitution,"63 reference to these related areas of the law
helps us to see that "privacy" is a concept that is intimately tied up with the
individual and her relationship to the world. This understanding is confirmed
by the vast body of critical literature that attempts to grapple with the concept
of privacy, its substance, and its limitations.
Theorists differ somewhat on the exact meaning and scope of the right to
privacy. Nevertheless, there is a widely shared consensus that privacy claims
are potent for the very reason that they are so tightly bound up with what it
means to be a freestanding and autonomous individual. This view is quite
clearly on display in Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's above-mentioned
article in the Harvard Law Review, the locus classicus of legal privacy theory.64
Solitude and privacy, they argue, are "essential to the individual" in an
increasingly intense and complex world." Legal protections for privacy are
necessary in order for individuals to enjoy their lives to the fullest and thereby
achieve their full personhood. Warren and Brandeis's emotionally tinged
account contains little suggestion that they would favor expanding privacy
protections to artificial persons. Indeed, it is precisely the naturalness of the
individual that they seek to protect from an increasingly mechanized and
bureaucratized modern world.
Warren and Brandeis's notion-that privacy is important for constructing
an image of oneself in relation to the chaos of the outside world- intersects
with another important and slightly different theory of privacy's function. This
is the widely shared idea that the value of privacy lies primarily in its utility as a
tool for structuring relations with other persons and, in particular, for
controlling one's self-presentation. As a legal construct, privacy goes beyond
the law of search and seizure or defamation to ensure that an individual may
"rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to
paint only certain parts."6 6 Robert Post, for example, suggests that by allowing
an individual "to press or to waive territorial claims" or "to choose respect or
63. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 n.13
(1989).
64. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 196 ("The intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world,
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so
that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.").
65. Id.
66. Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS IN
FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47, 84 (Transaction Publishers 2005) (1967).
392
120:379 2010
PRIVACY, PERSON HOOD, AND THE COURTS
intimacy," privacy is "deeply empowering for his sense of himself as an
independent or autonomous person."
This odd state of affairs, in which an individual's "sense of himself as an
independent or autonomous person" is vindicated only through the collective
actions of the community that he inhabits, 8  is entirely inapplicable to
corporations, which are both defined and circumscribed by the positive law
that creates them. Certainly, corporations have an interest in controlling
perceptions of themselves in much the same way that individuals do. As has
already been noted, however, the stakes in this game of self-presentation for
the individual are significantly different from those that confront corporations.
While corporations' financial fortunes may rise and fall with public perceptions
of them, "the ability ... to construct out of the multiplicity of one's experience
and expectations an individual personality" is a fundamentally human feature,
indeed "the definitive characteristic of human beings.",6 ,
Another function of privacy, alluded to by Post above, is its important role
in facilitating interpersonal intimacy, a uniquely human good. By providing
the possibility that some aspects of ourselves may be kept from the public at
large, privacy allows us to maintain a stock of intimate, secret information that
we may disclose to whomever we choose. These confidences in turn may serve,
in Charles Fried's terms, as "moral capital" that promotes feelings of love and
friendship unique to the human condition."o
Finally, Jed Rubenfeld's conception of privacy as an antitotalitarian
principle is particularly useful for understanding the inapplicability of the
concept to corporate persons. In Rubenfeld's view, privacy is important
because it "prevents the state from imposing on individuals a defined
identity."" Exemption 7 (C) fits this conceptualization nicely, since the
provision is quite clearly intended to avoid disclosures of items, such as
evidence of a criminal or civil investigation, that would lead the claimant to be
viewed in a negative or undesirable light by the general public. However,
Rubenfeld's account has purchase only where those persons claiming a privacy
67. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 973 (1989).
68. Id. at 986 n.141.
69. Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 754.
70. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142
(1970) ("To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each other.
Intimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs or emotions which one
does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring
this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.").
i. Rubenfeld, supra note 56, at 794.
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right are freely constituted -with values and desires that exist independent of
(and prior to) the state. Corporations, however, are "legal persons." They have
no existence independent of the law; accordingly, their identity, such as it
exists, will always be shaped by official power.
CONCLUSION
Although the legal issue that confronted the Third Circuit in AT&T might
have appeared complicated in light of the rapidly evolving federal
jurisprudence of corporate personhood, this Comment has suggested that it
need not have been. This is because a proper understanding of the term
"privacy" makes resolution of the personhood question, at least in this context,
unnecessary. As I argued above, the text and structure of FOIA provide strong
evidence that the notion of privacy embodied in the statute is a uniquely
human one. This view only gains support from the host of legal doctrines in
other fields that deny artificial persons the right to claim a privacy interest in
the true sense. Finally, as I demonstrated above, privacy as a theoretical and
philosophical concept only has meaning when applied to natural persons. In
the context of AT&T, a more comprehensive understanding of the notion of
"privacy," one that was informed by a serious consideration of the intratextual
and extratextual uses of the term that this Comment has sought to highlight,
would have compelled the conclusion that, to the extent that Exemption 7(C) is
clear on its face, that clarity weighs in favor of the agency's disclosure order.
Although the Third Circuit's holding in AT&T may seem narrow, its
implications are broad. FOIA was enacted with the promise of "ensur[ing] an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed."7 ' As recent events have demonstrated, corporate malfeasance has
the ability to affect the citizenry well beyond any damage that it might cause to
shareholders or business associates. It is a key function of government to
investigate and punish such malfeasance. The effect of the circuit court's
decision, however, is to remove an important tool through which the citizenry
can ensure that government is performing its designated function. In the wake
of AT&T, the "personal privacy" exemption will now be available to actors
whose misdeeds may sweep substantially broader than those of a single
individual. Congress's creation of the "personal privacy" exemption represents
a carefully calibrated effort to strike a workable balance between the right of
the public to know and the rights of individuals to control their self-
72. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
394
120:379 2010
PRIVACY, PERSONHOOD, AND THE COURTS
presentation. This exemption to the statute's general bias in favor of open
government should not be allowed to expand to the point at which it
overwhelms both the statute itself and our morally grounded, common-sense
notions of what "privacy" should mean.
SCOTT A. HARTMAN
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